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The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment:
A Retrospective on the Past Century and
Some Thoughts about the Next
Albert W. Alschulert
Discussions of the textbook purposes of criminal punishment-
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation' - some-
times seem too abstract to matter. This Essay, however, examines two
unmistakably consequential shifts in the stated objectives of punish-
ment. It describes America's turn to rehabilitative goals early in the
twentieth century, the persistence of these goals through most of the
century, and the demise of rehabilitation and emergence of a "new
penology" in the century's final quarter. It contends that both Ameri-
can revolutions in penal objectives were mistaken. Retribution, the
purpose of punishment most disparaged from the beginning of the
century through the end, merits recognition as the criminal law's cen-
tral objective.
I. THE DAWN OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
The twentieth century began with the confident march of reha-
bilitative trumpets. The nation's first juvenile court, established in
1899 in Cook County, became a model for reform throughout Amer-
ica. The guiding principle of this court was that juvenile delinquents
should be helped, not blamed. Society's best interests matched the
child's.
f Wilson-Dickinson Professor, The University of Chicago Law School.
1 One might reasonably add a "moral educative" objective to the traditional list to em-
phasize that the criminal law seeks to influence conduct through mechanisms other than the
fear of punishment.
2 See Emily Buss, The Missed Opportunity in Gault, 70 U Chi L Rev 39,39 (2003).
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During the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, an over-
whelming majority of states also approved two other major penal re-
forms: probation (treatment in the community for juveniles and
adults) and indeterminate sentences (grounded on the view that a pa-
role board could monitor a prisoner's progress toward rehabilitation
and release him under supervision at the appropriate time).' All of
these reforms deemphasized the historic view, voiced by William
Blackstone, that "punishments are ... only inflicted for abuse of that
free will, which God has given to man."'
Many early twentieth-century reformers doubted their ability to
blame. They saw people as the far-from-divine products of heredity,
social circumstances, random breeding, and Darwinian struggle. They
and others also insisted that blame was functionless and that society
should direct its efforts to more constructive goals. Like the rest of
law, criminal punishment should look forward, not backward. Psy-
chology and sociology, the handmaidens of consequentialist jurispru-
dence, would determine the causes of crime and what social reforms
and treatment programs would correct them.
The turn-of-the-century penal reforms were part of a jurispru-
dential revolution that reshaped all of American law. This revolution
deemphasized corrective justice in civil proceedings just as it did ret-
ribution in criminal proceedings.' It often is called "the revolt against
formalism," but it is better understood as a revolt against natural law
or objective concepts of right and wrong.7 In positive terms, it could
be called the "consequentialist" or "pragmatic" revolution. Its ideas
developed in the period following the American Civil War and the
publication of Charles Darwin's On the Origin of Species. These ideas
triumphed, at least among intellectuals, within less than half a century.
Criminal law was more resistant to the new jurisprudence than
other fields. Roscoe Pound complained in 1909, "The truth is ...
criminal law is the most archaic part of our legal system."' It "is so
rooted in theological ideas of free will and moral responsibility and
juridical ideas of retribution ... that we by no means make what we
3 See Lawrence M. Friedman, Crime and Punishment in American History 159-63
(Basic 1993).
4 William Blackstone, 4 Commentaries *27.
5 See Richard A. Posner, Overcoming Law 391 (Harvard 1995) ("The instrumental con-
cept of law breaks with Aristotle's influential theory of corrective justice.").
6 Morton G. White, The Revolt against Formalism in American Social Thought of the
Twentieth Century, 8 J Hist Ideas 131 (1947) (also published as chapter 2 of White's Social
Thought in America (Viking 1949)).
7 See Albert W Alschuler, Law without Values: The Life, Work, and Legacy of Justice
Holmes 9-10,86-103 (Chicago 2000).
8 Roscoe Pound, Book Review, 3 Am Polit Sci Rev 281, 284 (1909), reviewing Maurice
Parmelee, The Principles of Anthropology and Sociology in Their Relation to Criminal Proce-
dure (Macmillan 1908).
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should of our [scientific] discoveries."9 Criminal law was-and is
still-a backwater in which subjective standards of culpability and
talk of personal blame persist.
The 1870 meeting of the National Congress on Penitentiary and
Reformatory Discipline effectively inaugurated the movement that
produced the twentieth-century reforms.' The Congress's Declaration
of Principles "arraign[ed] society itself as in no slight degree account-
able for" crime, declared that "the supreme aim of prison discipline is
the reformation of criminals," and concluded that "[s]entences limited
only by satisfactory proof of reformation should be substituted for
those measured by mere lapse of time."" The Declaration added,
"[R]epeated short sentences for minor criminals are worse than use-
less .... Reformation is a work of time; and a benevolent regard to
the good of the criminal himself, as well as to the protection of society,
requires that his sentence be long enough for reformatory processes
to take effect."'"
In 1881, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. declared, "Prevention would
... seem to be the chief and only universal purpose of punishment."'3
Holmes, however, championed deterrence rather than rehabilitation.
He revealed that the deterrent worldview could be as deterministic
and as uninterested in blame as the rehabilitationist:
If I were having a philosophical talk with a man I was going to
have hanged ... I should say, I don't doubt that your act was in-
evitable for you but to make it more avoidable by others we
propose to sacrifice you to the common good. You may regard
yourself as a soldier dying for your country if you like. But the
law must keep its promises."
Progressive reformers generally echoed the National Peniten-
tiary Congress while their critics echoed Holmes. Gino Carlo Sper-
anza wrote in 1904:
9 Pound, 3 Am Polit Sci Rev at 283-84 (cited in note 8).
10 To be sure, reformers had advocated and implemented rehabilitative programs before
this meeting. See generally David J. Rothman, The Discovery of the Asylum: Social Order and
Disorder in the New Republic (Little, Brown 1971); Norval Morris, Maconochie's Gentlemen: The
Story of Norfolk Island and the Roots of Modern Prison Reform (Oxford 2002).
11 National Congress on Penitentiary and Reformatory Discipline, Declaration of Princi-
ples, in E.C. Wines, ed, Transactions of the National Congress on Penitentiary and Reformatory
Discipline 541-45 (Weed, Parsons 1871).
12 Idat543.
13 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 46 (Little, Brown 1991).
14 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Harold Laski, Dec 17, 1925, in Mark deWolfe
Howe, ed, 1 The Holmes-Laski Letters: The Correspondence of Mr. Justice Holmes and Harold J.
Laski, 1916-1935 806 (Harvard 1953). Holmes sought to replace requirements of subjective
mental culpability in criminal cases with objective standards, but apart from a few opinions of
his own for the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, he achieved little success. See Al-
schuler, Law without Values at 107-11 (cited in note 7).
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The conception of punishment as a defence to crime has gone
into bankruptcy: it neither defends nor deters. Criminal thera-
peutics must take its place; that is, where a cure is possible, let
the remedial agencies suggested by criminologic and sociologic
science have full scope. But where juridic therapeutics fail, let
there be no mistaken altruism to perpetuate the unfittest.5
Roscoe Pound spoke of the American legal system's "exagger-
ated respect for the individual,"'6 declared that behavioral science had
"routed" the concept of free will," and wrote, "We recognize that in
order to deal with crime in an intelligent and practical manner we
must give up the retributive theory.""
John H. Wigmore joined Holmes rather than Speranza and
Pound. He called deterrence "the kingpin of the criminal law"' 9 and
condemned "that false sympathy and dangerous weakening that is apt
to arise on first acceptance of the biopsychologic doctrine of Deter-
minism. 2 ° Wigmore opposed only false sympathy and dangerous
weakening, however, not determinism itself. He wrote,
The measures of the modern penal law are not based on moral
blame, but on social self-defense. When there is a weed in your
garden, and you cut it down, you do not do this on any theory of
the moral blame of the weed, but simply on the theory that you
21
are entitled to keep weeds out of your garden.
In 1924, Clarence Darrow's twelve-hour summation saved from
the gallows University of Chicago law student Nathan Leopold and
his friend Richard Loeb (who until his arrest expected to enter the
15 Gino Carlo Speranza, The Survival of the Weakest as Exemplified in the Criminal, 43
Am L Reg 159, 165-66 (1904). Thomas A. Green examines the writings of Speranza, Pound, and
their contemporaries in Freedom and Criminal Responsibility in the Age of Pound: An Essay on
Criminal Justice, 93 Mich L Rev 1915 (1995).
16 Roscoe Pound, Do We Need a Philosophy of Law?, 5 Colum L Rev 339,347 (1905).
17 See Green, 93 Mich L Rev at 1965 (cited in note 15).
18 Roscoe Pound, Criminal Justice in the American City-A Summary, in Roscoe Pound
and Felix Frankfurter, eds, Criminal Justice in Cleveland 559, 586-87 (Cleveland Foundation
1922).
19 A Symposium of Comments from the Legal Profession, in The Loeb-Leopold Murder of
Franks in Chicago, May 21,1924, 15 J Crim Law & Criminol 395,401 (1924).
20 Id at 405.
21 Id at 404. Wigmore added, "Society's right of self-defense is equally valid even when the
human weed was predetermined by nature and environment to do just what he did." Id. Holmes
had used similar metaphors ten years earlier:
The world has produced the rattlesnake as well as me; but I kill it if I get a chance, as also
mosquitos, cockroaches, murderers, and flies. My only judgment is that they are incongru-
ous with the world I want; the kind of world we all try to make according to our power.
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Lewis Einstein, May 21, 1914, in James B. Peabody,
ed, The Holmes-Einstein Letters: Correspondence of Mr. Justice Holmes and Lewis Einstein
1903-1935 93 (St. Martin's 1964).
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Law School himself)." After Leopold and Loeb pleaded guilty to the
murder of Bobby Franks, Darrow argued to the sentencing judge,
John Caverly:
What had this boy to do with it? He was not his own father; he
was not his own mother; he was not his own grandparents. All of
this was handed to him. He did not surround himself with gover-
nesses and wealth. He did not make himself. And yet he is to be
compelled to pay.
There was a time in England ... when judges used to ... call ju-
ries to try a horse, a dog, a pig, for crime.... Animals were tried.
Do you mean to tell me that Dickie Loeb had any more to do
with his making than any other product of heredity that is born
upon the earth?
Your Honor, I am almost ashamed to talk about it. I can hardly
imagine we are in the 20th century. And yet there are men who
seriously say that for what Nature has done, for what life has
done, for what training has done, you should hang these boys."
Is Dickie Loeb to blame because [ ] of the infinite forces that
conspired to form him, the infinite forces that were at work pro-
ducing him ages before he was born? ... Is he to blame that his
machine is imperfect? ... I know that somewhere in the past that
entered into him something missed. It may be defective nerves. It
may be a defective heart or liver. It may be defective endocrine
glands. I know it is something. I know that nothing happens in
this world without a cause."
Wigmore's paean to deterrence responded to Darrow's argument.
At the Sociology Department of the University of Chicago, the
first "Chicago School" used the city as a laboratory and developed
22 Hal Higdon, Leopold and Loeb: The Crime of the Century 199-200 (Illinois 1999) (not-
ing that Leopold enrolled in the Law School at the University of Chicago in the fall of 1923 and
that Loeb "planned to ... enter law school in the fall of 1924, remaining at the University of
Chicago").
My late uncle Jacob Alschuler (University of Chicago Law School Class of 1927) recalled
Darrow's visit to the Jewish fraternity Zeta Beta Tau in search of character witnesses for his cli-
ents. Upon ascertaining my uncle's opinion of Nathan Leopold, Darrow told him, "Obviously we
can't use you."
23 Arthur Weinberg, ed, Attorney for the Damned 65-66 (Simon & Schuster 1957).
24 Id at 55-56.
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pathbreaking cultural and environmental explanations of crime." The
university established America's first chair of police science, the pre-
cursor of today's many schools and departments of criminal justice, in
1929." Scholars, reformers, and many criminal justice officials contin-
ued to view crime as a public health problem susceptible to diagnosis
and cure.
II. A QUIET AFIERNOON
Rehabilitation remained the central professed goal of American
criminal justice-at least in most public rhetoric-until the final quar-
ter of the twentieth century." In 1949 the Supreme Court declared,
"Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law.
Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become important
goals."'8 In 1952, the Court spoke of "a tardy and unfinished substitu-
tion of deterrence and reformation in place of retaliation and venge-
ance as the motivation for public prosecution."2 In 1962, the Court
held that narcotics addiction was an illness whose punishment vio-
lated the cruel and unusual punishment clause."" The Court, however,
qualified its ruling sufficiently that it was able to beat a speedy re-
treat."
The Model Penal Code issued by the American Law Institute in
1962 endorsed almost the entire list of penal purposes,32 but it men-
tioned retribution only as a limiting principle." Its sentencing provi-
sions emphasized indeterminacy and treatment. They required that
every penitentiary sentence be for at least one year so that correc-
tional authorities could adequately diagnose each offender. More-
25 See Martin Bulmer, The Chicago School of Sociology: Institutionalization, Diversity, and
the Rise of Sociological Research 12 (Chicago 1984); James T. Carey, Sociology and Public Af-
fairs: The Chicago School 97 (Sage 1975).
26 See Arthur F Brandstatter, A History of Police Education in the United States, online at
http://www.cj.msu.edu/-history/scrap/abhistoryofpoliceed.pdf (visited Dec 1, 2002).
27 Unsurprisingly, everyday practice frequently bore little resemblance to the aspirational
writings and podium rhetoric of judges, prison wardens, probation officers, and academics.
28 Williams v New York, 337 US 241, 248 (1949). The Court offered its praise of rehabilita-
tion in a case in which the trial judge had sentenced the defendant to death partly on the basis
of hearsay allegations in a pre-sentence report.
29 Morissette v United States, 342 US 246,251 (1952).
30 See Robinson v California, 370 US 660,667 (1962).
31 See Powell v Texas, 392 US 514, 532 (1968) (plurality) (distinguishing the case from
Robinson on the ground that the appellant was not punished for the "mere status" of drunken-
ness but "for being in public while drunk on a particular occasion").
32 See MPC § 1.02 (AL Proposed Official Draft 1962).
33 See id § 1.02(1)(c) (declaring that one goal of the Code was "to safeguard conduct that
is without fault from condemnation as criminal"). See also Michael Tonry, Unthought Thoughts:
The Influence of Changing Sensibilities on Penal Policies, in David Garland, ed, Mass Imprison-
ment: Social Causes and Consequences 150, 155-59 (Sage 2001).
34 See MPC § 6.06; MPC § 6.06 & cmts 4,26 (ALl Tent Draft No 2 1954) ("A minimum of
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over, the code supplied the principal alternative to the traditional
"right-wrong" test of legal insanity.- Much of the post-World War II
effort to substitute treatment for punishment had focused on the
terms of this defense.3 The Model Penal Code's formulation was
adopted by about half the states and every United States Court of
Appeals but one."
Francis A. Allen, a member of the University of Chicago Law
School faculty, was the chair of the drafting committee for the Illinois
Criminal Code of 1961, one of the earliest codes to adopt the Model
Penal Code's insanity defense and sentencing principles. Allen's
scholarship, however, noted that the rehabilitative ideal had a trou-
blesome side, for it seemed to authorize both lengthy restrictions of
liberty and broad assumptions of governmental power over offenders'
personalities.'
Allen's work encouraged a search for limits, and scholars like
Stanford's Herbert Packer and Chicago's Norval Morris ' contended
that although moral desert or retribution could never justify punish-
ment, it should limit the punishments society imposes for other rea-
sons. 1 The Packer-Morris position sought to tame the utility monster,
one year on prison sentences for felony appears ... to be an institutional necessity.").
35 See MPC § 4.01 (ALl Proposed Official Draft 1962).
36 The District of Columbia Circuit ruled in Durham v United States, 214 F2d 862, 875
(DC Cir 1954), that a defendant could be convicted only if a jury "believe[d] beyond a reason-
able doubt either that he was not suffering from a diseased or defective mental condition, or
that the act was not the product of such abnormality." The Durham opinion made its author,
Chief Judge David Bazelon, an icon of the psychiatric profession. The D.C. Circuit abandoned
the "product" test in United States v Brawner, 471 F2d 969, 981-82 (DC Cir 1972). Despite
heated battles over the issue, variations in the phrasing of the insanity defense seem to have lit-
tle effect on jury verdicts. See Rita James Simon, The Jury and the Defense of Insanity 67-68
(Little, Brown 1967) (finding no statistically significant difference between the verdicts of juries
receiving instructions under the right-wrong test and those receiving instructions under the
product test).
37 See Sanford H. Kadish and Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Law and Its Processes:
Cases and Materials 894 (Aspen 7th ed 2001).
38 The Illinois Code was in fact enacted before the American Law Institute approved the
MPC itself.
39 See Francis A. Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 50 J
Crim L, Criminol & Police Sci 226, 229 (1959) ("[Tlhe rehabilitative ideal has often led to in-
creased severity of penal measures."); Francis A. Allen, The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal:
Penal Policy and Social Purpose 47 (Yale 1981) ("One immediate consequence of a rehabilita-
tive regime is a drastic enlargement of state concerns. The state's interests now embrace not
only the offender's conduct, but ... his motives, his history, his social environment.").
40 Morris, who joined the Chicago faculty in 1964, served for ten years as the founding di-
rector of the Law School's Center for Studies in Criminal Justice and for four years as the Law
School's dean. See Albert W. Alschuler, Norval, 1994 U Chi Legal F 1, 1-4 (celebrating the
(truly) epic life of Norval Morris upon his retirement).
41 See Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 66 (Stanford 1968) ("I see
an important limiting principle in the criminal law's traditional emphasis on blameworthiness as
a prerequisite to the imposition of punishment. But it is a limiting principle, not a justification
for action."); Norval Morris, Madness and the Criminal Law 199 (Chicago 1982) ("Desert is not
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and although Packer and Morris did not say so, it required the rejec-
tion of determinism. Moreover, the Supreme Court seemed to recog-
nize the danger of rehabilitative rhetoric when it imposed many tradi-
tional safeguards of the criminal process on juvenile delinquency pro-
41
ceedings.
Although scholars and courts increasingly recognized the need to
constrain rehabilitative goals, these goals remained dominant. 3 In
1968, 72 percent of the respondents to a Harris poll declared that the
prison system's primary purpose should be rehabilitation." In 1970,
soon after concluding his service as Attorney General, Ramsey Clark
(University of Chicago Law School class of 1951) ' revealed that the
orthodox progressive view of criminal justice had changed little since
the start of the twentieth century:
Rehabilitation must be the goal of modern corrections. Every
other consideration should be subordinated to it. To rehabilitate
is to give health, freedom from drugs and alcohol, to provide
education, vocational training, understanding and the ability to
contribute to society.
Rehabilitation is individual salvation. What achievement can
give society greater satisfaction than to afford the offender the
chance, once lost, to live at peace, to fulfill himself and to help
a defining principle; it is a limiting principle.").
42 See In re Gault, 387 US 1, 34-57 (1967) (affording the right to counsel and the privilege
against self-incrimination to accused delinquents); In re Winship, 397 US 358, 365 (1970) (af-
fording the right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt). But see McKeiver v Pennsylvania, 403
US 528,543-50 (1971) (declining to extend the right to jury trial to accused delinquents).
43 See, for example, the optimistic assessments of rehabilitative prospects in Norval Morris
and Gordon Hawkins, The Honest Politician's Guide to Crime Control 110-44 (Chicago 1970)
and Karl Menninger, The Crime of Punishment 219-48 (Viking 1966).
44 Francis T. Cullen and Karen E. Gilbert, Reaffirming Rehabilitation 8 (Anderson 1982).
45 Four Attorneys General in the past 35 years have studied or taught (or both) at the
University of Chicago Law School, and all have played significant roles in shaping American
criminal justice. Ramsey Clark approved the prosecution of Dr. Benjamin Spock, authored
some portions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, and temporarily
brought a halt to widespread FBI wiretapping. Clark's predecessor as Attorney General, Nicho-
las Katzenbach, who recently had been a member of the Law School faculty, headed the Presi-
dent's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. Surprisingly, this
group's 1967 report still provides the best comprehensive treatment of the operation and fail-
ings of the criminal justice system as a whole. The war on terrorism has led Attorney General
John Ashcroft (class of 1967) to approve a number of procedural innovations, including relaxa-
tion of the guidelines for undercover FBI investigations promulgated by Attorney General Ed-
ward Levi (class of 1935, professor, dean of the Law School, and president of the University).
See Neil A. Lewis, Traces of Terror: The Inquiry; Ashcroft Permits EB.L to Monitor Internet and
Public Activities, NY Times A20 (May 31,2002) (describing Ashcroft's revision of the guidelines
to allow increased surveillance of the internet, and political and religious organizations).
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others? Rehabilitation is also the one clear way that criminal jus-
tice processes can significantly reduce crime. '
III. THE SUNSET OF THE CENTURY
Within fifteen years of Ramsey Clark's remarks, rehabilitation
had gone from the top of most scholars' and reformers' lists of the
purposes of punishment to the bottom. The dominant goal of criminal
punishment changed almost in an instant, and the first became last.
The demise of rehabilitation was attributable less to jurispruden-
tial reflection than to apparent empirical failure. After Vietnam and
Watergate, Americans were skeptical of government's ability to
achieve its goals, and ambitious rehabilitative programs seemed espe-
cially inviting targets for reform. The title of an influential 1974 article
asked What Works? In essence the article answered, "nothing."4 7 This
article reviewed all of the empirical evaluations of rehabilitative pro-
grams then in print in England and America, and found 231 that met
minimal methodological standards. It concluded, "With few and iso-
lated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have been reported so
far have had no appreciable effect on recidivism."' Later studies (in-
cluding one by the author of What Works?) declared this judgment
too pessimistic, 9 but social science plainly had not provided the happy
answers its early champions expected.
The sentencing reform movement of the 1970s and 1980s
prompted America's reconsideration of its penal goals. Initially, this
movement seemed to be about reducing the sentencing disparities
that can result from the differing views and personalities of judges.
The hawks and the doves of criminal process both welcomed it. In
retrospect, however, the movement appears to have been a Trojan
horse whose procedural facade concealed the soldiers of substantive
change. It proved to be less about correcting disparities than about
radically altering sentencing standards, deemphasizing the personal
characteristics of offenders, substituting aggregated for individualized
sentences, enhancing the power of prosecutors, and increasing the
46 Ramsey Clark, Crime in America: Observations on Its Nature, Causes, Prevention and
Control 220 (Simon & Schuster 1970).
47 See generally Robert Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers about Prison Re-
form, 35 Pub Int 22 (Spring 1974).
48 Id at 25 (emphasis omitted).
49 See Robert Martinson, New Findings, New Views: A Note of Caution Regarding Sentenc-
ing Reform, 7 Hofstra L Rev 243, 252 (1979) (declaring that "new evidence from our current
study leads me to reject my original conclusion" in What Works?); Michael Vitiello, Reconsider-
ing Rehabilitation, 65 Tulane L Rev 1011, 1032 (1991) (stating that "opponents of rehabilitation
grossly overstated the case against rehabilitation").
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severity of criminal penalties. °
A few sentencing reformers spoke explicitly of abandoning for-
ward-looking preventive goals and embracing a policy of "just de-
serts."5 Their concept of "desert," however, was primitive, emphasiz-
ing social harm rather than the character and culpability of offenders.
Statutes and guidelines took the form of crime tariffs. '2 The earliest of
the new determinate sentencing statutes, enacted in California in
1976, declared:
The Legislature finds and declares that the purpose of impris-
onment for crime is punishment. This purpose is best served by
terms proportionate to the seriousness of the offense with provi-
sion for uniformity in the sentences of offenders committing the
same offense under similar circumstances.53
Talk of "just deserts" soon vanished, but the emphasis on quanti-
fiable harm rather than circumstances or personal characteristics per-
sisted. In 1987, a preliminary draft of the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines declared, "[T]o the extent that principles derived from retribu-
tive and crime control models conflict, justice for the public is the
overreaching goal."'- The Sentencing Commission (perhaps embar-
rassed by its inadvertent substitution of the word "overreaching" for
the word it apparently intended) used more amorphous language in
its final draft but did not significantly alter the Guidelines' content."
50 I noted in 1991,
The change in sentencing philosophy that sentencing guidelines and sentencing reform
legislation have produced may be attributable partly to limitations of language. Describing
the appropriate influence of situational and personal characteristics on punishment is diffi-
cult. Sentencing guidelines have become crime tariffs in part because it is easier to write
them that way.
Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U
Chi L Rev 901,914 (1991). See also Kate Stith and Jos6 A. Cabranes, Fear of Judging: Sentencing
Guidelines in the Federal Courts 1-8 (Chicago 1998) (reviewing the history of the Guidelines
and describing their pernicious effect on sentencing).
51 See, for example, Andrew von Hirsch, Doing Justice: The Choice of Punishments 66-76
(Northeastern 1976) (arguing that just deserts "should have priority over other objectives in
decisions about how much to punish").
52 von Hirsch initially recognized that "'[sleriousness' depends both on the harm done (or
risked) by the act and the degree of the actor's culpability." Id at 69. Ultimately, however, he
proposed a sentencing scheme with a "presumptive sentence" for every offense from which a
judge could depart only if a case was "out-of-the-ordinary" and then only slightly. Id at 98-102.
53 Cal Penal Code § 1170(a)(1) (West 1985).
54 United States Sentencing Commission, Revised Draft Sentencing Guidelines 2 (Jan
1987).
55 United States Sentencing Commission, Sentencing Guidelines and Policy Statements
1.3-1.4 (Apr 1987) ("A clear-cut Commission decision in favor of [either the retributive or
crime control model] would diminish the chance that the guidelines would find the widespread
acceptance they need for effective implementation. As a practical matter, in most sentencing
[70:1
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When sentencing authorities in the late twentieth century took
account of offender characteristics, they focused more on characteris-
tics indicating dangerousness than on those indicating culpability. No-
tably, the Virginia Sentencing Commission declared that a drug, lar-
ceny, or fraud defendant who "scored" ten or more points should go
to prison. It then directed judges to add six points whenever the of-
fender was younger than twenty. Until the end of the twentieth cen-
tury, virtually everyone had regarded youth as a mitigating rather
than an aggravating circumstance. The Virginia Commission also di-
rected judges to add points for being unmarried, unemployed, or
male.57
Late twentieth-century crime control emphasized incapacitation
and deterrence. For a time, "selective incapacitation" (the statistical
identification and long-term confinement of a relatively small group
of offenders believed responsible for a disproportionate share of
crime) was fashionable," but variables other than prior criminal re-
cord added very little to the predictive power of the social scientists'
formulas. 9 Economists emphasized deterrence, and they sometimes
were influential. For example, although most Americans regard steal-
ing money from the government as a more serious offense than failing
to pay the same amount in taxes," the United States Sentencing
Commission punished the tax evasion more severely. Because tax
evaders were detected less frequently than thieves, the Commission
approved the harsher punishment for deterrent reasons."
Although one can describe the crime control techniques of the
last quarter-century in terms of traditional purposes of punishment,
they differ from earlier measures. Scholars have spoken of a "new pe-
decisions both philosophies may prove consistent with the same result.").
56 See Michael Tonry, Rethinking Unthinkable Punishment Policies in America, 46 UCLA
L Rev 1751,1759-61 (1999).
57 See id.
58 See Peter W. Greenwood and Allan Abrahamse, Selective Incapacitation xix (Rand
1982) ("[W]e have shown that selective incapacitation strategies may lead to significant reduc-
tions in crime without increasing the total number of offenders incarcerated.").
59 See Jacqueline Cohen, Incapacitating Criminals: Recent Research Findings (National In-
stitute of Justice 1983).
60 See Francis T. Cullen, Bruce G. Link, and Craig W. Polanzi, The Seriousness of Crimes
Revisited: Have Attitudes Toward White-Collar Crime Changed?, 20 Criminol 83, 98 (1982) (de-
scribing a survey in which respondents gave a relatively low seriousness rating to income tax
fraud); Peter H. Rossi, et al, The Seriousness of Crimes: Normative Structure and Individual Dif-
ferences, 39 Am Soc Rev 224, 228-29 (1974) (reporting that in a survey in which respondents
were asked to rank the relative seriousness of various crimes, tax evasion ranked 106, below
various forms of theft and embezzlement).
61 United States Sentencing Commission, Sentencing Guidelines and Policy Statements
2.112 (cited in note 55) ("Especially in light of the limited number of criminal tax prosecutions
relative to the estimated incidence of such violations ... deterring others from violating the tax
laws is the primary consideration underlying these guidelines.").
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nology" that emphasizes monitoring, risk management, and the con-
trol of dangerous groups.6' This penology regards the criminal justice
system as an ever-more prominent component-indeed, the dominant
component-of society's response to an enduring "underclass." Its fo-
cus is on system rationality and actuarial thinking. Rather than treat
cases and people one by one, the new penology treats cases and peo-
ple in groups.
One can discern this new penology in sentencing guidelines and
mandatory minimum sentences that allocate punishment wholesale
rather than retail. The new penology also is evident in a number of
other innovations and practices: "real offense sentencing" (the prac-
tice of adding punishment-enhancing points not only for crimes of
which a defendant has been convicted but also for other crimes de-
scribed as "relevant conduct"); 63 supposed alternatives to incarcera-
tion that do not in fact reduce the number of people sentenced to
confinement but instead widen the net of penal control;6' preventive
detention prior to trial;" mass searches;6 gang loitering ordinances,
youth curfews, and order-maintenance policing;6'7 limitations of the in-
62 See Malcolm Feeley and Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging
Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications, 30 Criminol 449 (1992).
63 These other crimes need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and may include of-
fenses of which the defendant has been acquitted. See United States v Watts, 519 US 148, 156-57
(1997) ("[A] jury's verdict of acquittal does not prevent the sentencing court from considering
conduct underlying the acquitted charge, so long as that conduct has been proved by a prepon-
derance of the evidence.").
64 See Michael Tonry, Intermediate Sanctions in Sentencing Reform, 2 U Chi Roundtable
391, 397 (1995) ("This not uncommon pattern, where judges use intermediate sanctions for of-
fenders other than those program planners had in mind, is often pejoratively characterized as
'net widening."'). The nearly 300 specialized drug courts established in 48 states also seem to
have widened the net of penal control. These courts have facilitated the felony prosecution of
defendants who earlier would have been prosecuted for misdemeanors if prosecuted at all. Al-
though drug courts emphasize treatment and monitoring as their initial response to drug crime
(and although their methods do seem to reduce drug recidivism slightly), so many of their "cli-
ents" fail to respond to treatment that the courts ultimately sentence larger numbers to prison.
See Morris Hoffman, The Drug Court Scandal, 78 NC L Rev 1437, 1534 (2000) ("Net-widening
is so large that, even if drug courts truly were effective in reducing recidivism, more drug defen-
dants would continue to jam our prisons than ever before.").
65 See Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 USC § 3142(c) (West 2000) (ending a right to bail in
noncapital cases that had existed in the federal courts since the first Judiciary Act in 1789).
66 See, for example, Board of Education v Earls, 122 S Ct 2559, 2562 (2002) (upholding a
school policy requiring students in competitive extracurricular activities to submit to drug test-
ing); United States v Drayton, 122 S Ct 2105, 2110-14 (2002) (illustrating today's expansive con-
cept of consent searches); Vernonia School District v Acton, 515 US 646, 664-65 (1995) (uphold-
ing the use of random drug tests for student athletes); Florida v Bostick, 501 US 429, 434-35
(1991) (upholding the practice of boarding buses during scheduled stops and requesting consent
to conduct drug searches); Michigan Department of State Police v Sitz, 496 US 444, 455 (1990)
(upholding the use of checkpoints to search for drunk drivers).
67 See Bernard E. Harcourt, Illusion of Order: The False Promise of Broken Windows Po-
licing 1-22 (Harvard 2001) (discussing the rise of order-maintenance and "broken windows"
policing).
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sanity defense;6' requirements that sex offenders register and give
public notice of their presence in a community;" the confinement of
sex offenders who are not sufficiently mentally ill to satisfy ordinary
civil commitment standards but who have completed their criminal
sentences;0 restrictions of habeas corpus;7' and requiring the trial and
punishment of many juveniles as adults.2
The politics of crime contributed to the change in penology, and
the 1960s heralded the change. This decade was a period of increasing
crime, youthful experimentation with drugs, police repression of civil
rights demonstrators, draft-card and flag burning, Stokely Carmichael,
Jane Fonda, the assassinations of John F Kennedy, Robert Kennedy,
and Martin Luther King, Jr., Black Panthers, Richard Speck, the ap-
pearance of a University of Chicago Law School graduate on the
EB.I.'s ten-most-wanted list,73 sexual liberation, the Chicago Eight,
and the Warren Court's due process revolution. Although political
calls for tough punishments were nothing new, the presidential elec-
tion of 1964 appears to have been the first in which a major-party
candidate, Barry Goldwater, made crime a national issue. Goldwater
lost badly, but in 1968 Richard Nixon supported the "peace forces"
against the "criminal forces," called for a new attorney general, and
won. Crime remained an issue in subsequent presidential elections-
perhaps most notably in 1988 when George H.W. Bush, after carefully
testing voter responses to potential campaign issues, made Willie Hor-
ton and the Massachusetts prison furlough program a model of nega-
tive campaigning and appeal to fear.
68 The history of the insanity defense can be separated into two periods-the 800 years
prior to 1982 and the 20 years after. The event dividing these periods was the acquittal by rea-
son of insanity of John Hinckley following his shooting and wounding of President Reagan.
During the pre-1982 period, courts and legislatures expanded the scope of the insanity defense.
In the post-1982 period, Congress and state legislatures restricted it. They did so by reverting to
the 1843 M'Naghten or "right-wrong" test of insanity, by shifting the burden of persuasion to the
defendant, by authorizing juries in some states to return verdicts of "guilty but insane" (meaning
"guilty"), and in four states by abolishing the insanity defense altogether. See Kadish and Schul-
hofer, Criminal Law and Its Processes at 894-95,902 (cited in note 37).
69 See, for example, NJ Stat Ann § 2C:7 (West 1995) (Megan's Law).
70 See Kansas v Crane, 534 US 407, 411-15 (2001); Kansas v Hendricks, 521 US 346, 371
(1997).
71 See, for example, Teague v Lane, 489 US 288 (1989); Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-132, 110 Stat 1214.
72 See Donna M. Bishop, Juvenile Offenders in the Adult Criminal Justice System, 27 Crime
& Just 81, 84 (2000) ("Between 1992 and 1997, legislatures in forty-four states and the District
of Columbia enacted provisions to facilitate the removal of young offenders to criminal court.").
73 Bernadine Dohrn (class of 1967), a member of the Weather Underground, surrendered
in 1980 and pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated battery and two counts of jumping bail.
She later was imprisoned for seven months for refusing to cooperate with a federal grand jury.
She is now the Director of the Children and Family Justice Center of the Northwestern Univer-
sity Law School.
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As the new penology grew in influence, the number of inmates in
state and federal prisons increased from 196,000 in 1972 to 1,159,000
in 1997-a nearly six-fold increase in 25 years. 4 A similar explosion in
local jail populations has brought the total number of Americans be-
hind bars to more than 2,000,000."' In the decade from 1985 to 1995,
federal and state governments opened an average of one new prison
each week.76 Our current rate of incarceration -roughly 1 of every 150
Americans-is 6 to 10 times the rate of other Western industrialized
countries." It is higher than that of every other nation whose rate we
can approximate except Russia's.78 This difference between the United
States and other industrialized nations is explained more by our penal
policies than by our not-very-different crime rates. 9 The United States
not only incarcerates a higher proportion of its population than other
Western democracies; it is also the only Western democracy to retain
the death penalty, and the number of executions has been rising."°
David Garland writes:
Imprisonment becomes mass imprisonment when it ceases to be
the incarceration of individual offenders and becomes the sys-
tematic imprisonment of whole groups of the population. In the
case of the USA, the group concerned is, of course, young black
males in large urban centres. For these sections of the popula-
tion, imprisonment has become normalized. It has come to be a
regular, predictable part of experience, rather than a rare and in-
frequent event.1
IV. MAKING SENSE OF CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT
In retrospect, American penology in the twentieth century ap-
pears to have been a mistake. Optimistic reformers led penology from
its traditional path early in the century, and disillusioned reformers
marched it deeper into the woods at the century's end.
74 Marc Mauer, Race to Incarcerate 114 (New Press 1999).
75 Fox Butterfield, Tight Budgets Force States to Reconsider Crime and Penalties, NY
Times Al (Jan 21,2002).
76 Mauer, Race to Incarcerate at 1 (cited in note 74).
77 Id at 19-23.
78 Seeidat 19.
79 See generally Franklin E. Zimring and Gordon Hawkins, Crime is Not the Problem: Le-
thal Violence in America ch 1 (Oxford 1997) (demonstrating that, apart from crimes of lethal
violence, "rates of crime are not greatly different in the United States from those in other de-
veloped nations").
80 See Franklin E. Zimring, The Contradictions of American Capital Punishment Figure 1.1
(Oxford forthcoming 2003).
81 David Garland, Introduction: The Meaning of Mass Imprisonment, in Garland, ed, Mass
Imprisonment at 1-2 (cited in note 33) (emphasis omitted).
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This Part turns from history to jurisprudence. It contends that
retribution, a seemingly archaic, backwards-looking goal dismissed by
the champions of rehabilitation at one end of the twentieth century
and by the champions of "crime control" at the other, merits recogni-
tion as the central purpose of criminal punishment.
The term retribution is often misunderstood. A retributivist be-
lieves that the imposition of deserved punishment is an intrinsic good.
This proposition defines her as a retributivist, and it is the only propo-
sition to which she must be committed. Her view of punishment sepa-
rates her sharply from people who regard punishment as an intrinsic
evil-who declare with Jeremy Bentham, "[A]I1 punishment in itself is
evil.... [I]f it ought at all to be admitted, it ought only to be admitted
in as far as it promises to exclude some greater evil.""
The champions of retribution and its critics have combined to
give it bad press. Although a retributivist must believe that the impo-
sition of deserved punishment is an intrinsic good, she need not be-
lieve that it is the only intrinsic good. She need not join Immanuel
Kant in the view that imposing just punishment is a categorical im-
perative.' She need not join Michael Moore in saying that the retribu-
tivist punishes only because the offender deserves it." She need not
deny the legitimacy of other goals of punishment. She need not join
James Fitzjames Stephen in the belief that "it is morally right to hate
criminals."85 She may impose punishment with sadness rather than
with what Jeffrie Murphy calls "retributive hatred.""
A recently invented mechanical device, the Pulverizer, supplies a
test of whether one views retribution to some degree as a virtue inde-
pendent of its consequences -that is, whether one supports retributiv-
ism as a deontological position. This imaginary machine also tests
whether one regards retribution, not merely as a limiting principle,
but as an affirmative reason for punishing.
82 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in Jeremy
Bentham and John Stuart Mill, The Utilitarians 162 (Dolphin 1961).
83 See Immanuel Kant, The Philosophy of Law 195 (Augustus M. Kelley 1887) (W. Hastie,
trans) ("The Penal Law is a Categorical Imperative; and woe to him who creeps through the
serpent-windings of Utilitarianism to discover some advantage that may discharge him from the
Justice of Punishment, or even from the due measure of it.").
84 Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in Ferdinand David Schoeman, ed,
Responsibility, Character and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology 179, 179 (Cam-
bridge 1987).
85 James Fitzjames Stephen, 2 A History of the Criminal Law of England 81 (MacMillan
1883).
86 Jeffrie G. Murphy, Hatred: A Qualified Defense, in Jeffrie G. Murphy and Jean Hamp-
ton, Forgiveness and Mercy 88, 108 (Cambridge 1988) (declaring with many qualifications that
"retributive hatred" is "in principle the natural, fitting, and proper response to certain instances
of wrongdoing").
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The Pulverizer instantly and painlessly dematerializes murderers.
To maximize its deterrent effect, its inventors have proposed using it
for televised executions at the halftime of the Super Bowl. Or, to be
more forthcoming, everyone believes the Pulverizer dematerializes
murderers. In reality, it transports them to Candy Mountain where
they enjoy better lives than they have ever known. The inventors of
the Pulverizer realized that, compared to actual executions, simulated
executions would be Pareto efficient. A murderer's pretended execu-
tion coupled with his banishment to a lovely mountain in a galaxy far,
far away would make at least one person (the murderer) better off
and no one worse off87
People who oppose use of the Pulverizer must believe that effi-
ciency and consequences are not everything. They believe that re-
wards and punishments should be allocated at least partly on the basis
of desert.
Although the classical retributive position is deontological, a re-
tributivist who emphasizes the beneficial consequences of her posi-
tion is not cheating. When someone is convinced that her position has
good consequences, to ask whether she would take the same position
if she did not believe in its good consequences is to ask an impossible
question. Socrates said that justice is a good of the highest order-a
good to be valued both for itself and for its consequences." The intrin-
sic and consequential virtues of justice cannot entirely be untied.
Paul Robinson and John Darley recently published a fine article
with an even finer title, The Utility of Desert.89 Robinson and Darley,
however, missed the principal effect of justice on behavior, and most
other commentators have missed it too."
A familiar consequentialist argument for retribution-one not
endorsed by Robinson and Darley-is that law must accommodate
87 The parable of the Pulverizer was told to me by David Friedman, but I have embel-
lished it. Jeremy Bentham obtained the initial patent on the principle of the Pulverizer. He sug-
gested that a forger might be exhibited to the public with his hand "transfixed by an iron in-
strument fashioned like a pen," and a slanderer might be exhibited with his tongue pierced. In
both instances, the punishment might "be made more formidable in appearance than in reality,
by dividing the instrument in two parts, so that the part which should pierce the offending mem-
ber need not be thicker than a pin, whilst the other part of the instrument may be much thicker,
and appear to penetrate with all its thickness." Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Penal Law, in
John Bowring, ed, 1 The Works of Jeremy Bentham 365, 408 (William Tait 1843). Bentham de-
clared that "the apparent punishment ... does all the service" while "the real punishment ...
does all the mischief." Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation, in Bowring, ed,
1 Works of Bentham 1, 92-93.
88 See Plato, The Republic 45 (Collier rev ed 1901) (Benjamin Jowett, trans).
89 Paul H. Robinson and John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw U L Rev 453 (1997).
90 At least one commentator, however, has not missed it. See Herbert Morris, On Guilt
and Innocence: Essays in Legal Philosophy and Moral Psychology 34 (California 1976) (Peo-
ple's "disposition to comply voluntarily will diminish as they learn that others are with impunity
renouncing burdens they are assuming.").
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the retributive sentiments of the public to prevent lynchings, blood
feuds, and other ugly forms of self-help.9' Another argument-also
blessedly unendorsed by Robinson and Darley-is that the act of
punishing promotes social solidarity." The society that slays together
stays together. Robinson and Darley regard the criminal law princi-
pally as a signaling mechanism. They speak of expressing social disap-
proval, of shaping norms, and of moral education. Retributive justice
can do these things, but it also can do more.
I have argued that somewhere in the psychology of most of us is
an implicit "giving-receiving" ratio. Some people-a few-may give
regardless of whether they receive anything in return. Others may
take and never give. Most people, however, fall into neither of these
categories. Some of them give two, three, or ten times what they re-
ceive, yet even these people are likely to cease giving when they sense
that the "return for giving" ratio has grown too far out of line. Crimi-
nal punishment is one of the social institutions that helps to keep the
"return for giving" ratio in balance.93
I offered a parable of parking violation to explain my thesis:
Several years ago, Adam moved to a neighborhood in Chicago in
which parking regulations were seldom enforced. He frequently
found his way and his vision blocked by unlawfully parked, un-
ticketed cars. As Adam grew accustomed to the realities of life in
this neighborhood, his own parking behavior changed.
Adam still does not park in . . . spaces reserved for the handi-
capped. When the only available parking space is too close to an
intersection to be lawful, however, Adam takes it. Adam was a
nicer person and a better citizen when he lived in Colorado.
Adam also was happier. When he could improve other people's
lives (or, more modestly, facilitate their driving and parking) with
confidence that most of them would do the same for him, he felt
better about himself and his community.'
The lack of parking-law enforcement in Adam's neighborhood
changed his behavior. The principal reason for his violation of the
91 See Stephen, 2 Criminal Law of England at 82 (cited in note 85) (arguing that the
criminal law stands to the passion of revenge in much the same relation as marriage to the sex-
ual appetite).
92 See Itmile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society 62-66 (MacMillan 1933)
(George Simpson, trans).
93 See Alschuler, Law without Values at 149 (cited in note 7). The golden rule-"do unto
others as you would have them do unto you"-prescribes non-reciprocal altruism, but reciprocal
altruism is the more natural kind. See Timothy H. Goldsmith and William E Zimmerman, Biol-
ogy, Evolution, and Human Nature 136-37 (John Wiley & Sons 2001) (describing the evolution
of reciprocal altruism in nonhuman species).
94 Alschuler, Law without Values at 149 (cited in note 7).
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parking laws, however, was not that he thought he could get away with
it. It was not that he feared punishment less than he did in his former
neighborhood. It was not that he was less concerned about incurring
social disapproval. It was not that he was less educated about the
wrongfulness of illegal parking.
Adam would have desisted from his lawlessness if only his
neighbors had desisted from theirs. When he was required to endure
the burdens of life among incorrigible parking violators, however, he
thought himself a fool not to capture a portion of the benefits. Adam,
I noted,
is unwilling to do much more than his share. He would prefer a
regime of mutual cooperation to one of every person for himself,
but he prefers a regime of every person for himself to one of
"cooperation for suckers." In Adam's neighborhood in Chicago,
the bonds of the social compact have weakened.
Sanctions matter to Adam less because his own principal reason
for law observance is the fear of punishment than because sanc-
tions applied to others reinforce his sense of reciprocity and mu-
tual obligation.9'
Adam's tale brings the central reason for imposing criminal
punishment into focus. Withholding punishment is inappropriate
when doing so would encourage people to conclude, "Everyone else is
looking out for themselves, and I'll be a fool unless I become a little
bit like them." When withholding criminal punishment would leave
the giving-receiving ratio out of balance and make selfish action more
likely, society has good reason to punish.
Sometimes, however, withholding punishment does not undercut
the social contract or the general sense of reciprocity and mutual ob-
ligation. The wrongdoer may not seem to be a freerider; he may ap-
pear to be more sinned against than sinning; he may have had no real
choice; he may have been subjected to extraordinary temptations; he
may have been too immature to be responsible; he may have suffered
enough; we may accept his apology and expression of remorse as sin-
cere. Retributivism takes these circumstances into account without
strain or rationalization. The other textbook purposes of punishment
do not. ' Recognizing the need to take circumstances like these into
account yields no metric for punishment and allows room for other,
95 Id at 150.
96 Some of the circumstances recited do indicate whether an offender is likely to repeat
her misconduct and therefore bear on whether punishment would advance rehabilitative or in-
capacitative goals, but several others do not.
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non-retributive goals to influence an offender's punishment. Blame,
however, remains at the core of the criminal process.
Part of retributivism's bad press stems from the perception that
its object is to match punishment to harm. Using the word "retribu-
tion" as a prompt in a game of free association probably would evoke
one response more frequently than any other: "an eye for an eye."
Envisioning retribution as "an eye for an eye" makes the other pur-
poses of punishment look good. Desert, however, not harm, is what
retributivism is about, and desert depends as much or more on cir-
cumstances and personal characteristics as upon physical actions and
harm. The formula "an eye for an eye" is horrifying precisely because
it does not adequately take account of an offender's culpability.'
The consequential argument for retributivism offered above-
that keeping the giving-receiving ratio in balance promotes a sense of
mutual obligation-turns on how a society perceives desert rather
than on desert itself. When perceptions of desert conflict, however, the
concept that emerges from democratic processes is probably the
nearest approximation of desert a polity can attain." Official judg-
ments of blame are likely to reflect either the majority's own view of
desert or its recognition that officials with greater knowledge, time, or
other advantage can make sounder judgments than the majority itself.
The concept of desert that emerges from democratic processes ordi-
narily will be widely shared or respected. It will have the utilitarian
virtue of promoting a sense of reciprocity. Moreover, recognizing that
criminal punishment is not simply an instrumental good discourages
unweighted procedural tradeoffs of the sort that have characterized
the new penology.
David Dolinko has written, "[O]ne commonplace of moral rea-
soning is that 'ought' implies 'can'-people cannot be blamed for
conduct they could not have avoided." Twentieth-century reformers
gave up on retribution largely because they gave up on human auton-
omy, a concept they believed science had discredited. "I know nothing
happens in this world without a cause," Clarence Darrow told the sen-
tencing judge in the Leopold-Loeb case. It was turtles all the way
down.
Philosophers continue to write about free will, recently offering
and criticizing a strange series of "compatibilist" arguments that free
97 Generations of progressives, taught that retribution focuses on the crime and rehabilita-
tion on the criminal, may have believed themselves more committed to rehabilitation than they
were in fact. Their principal commitment may have been simply to recognizing the importance
of an offender's personal circumstances in determining his punishment.
98 Obviously this is not to say that desert is itself a purely social concept or that any
individual should abandon her own view of moral desert in favor of the majority's.
99 David Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination?, 33
UCLA L Rev 1063,1095-96 (1986).
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will and determinism can both be true."'° The conundrums of free will
remain mysteries, however, and whichever side bears the burden of
proof is sure to lose. I cannot prove you have free will, and you cannot
prove I don't.
The seventeenth-century shift in focus from irregularities in na-
ture (miracles) to regularities or patterns changed the world for the
better. Of course, the search for material causes of mental phenomena
should proceed as far as it will go. The methodological premises of the
scientific enterprise, however, remain premises, not answers.
The philosopher Robert Fogelin once described his fourteen-
year-old son's junior-high-school science project-a crab machine.
This machine consisted of a photoelectric beam and two pairs of pin-
cers. It seized any object that interrupted the beam. Fogelin remarked,
"That is all there is to a crab, and in fifty years we will know it is all
there is to us.'"''
Consciousness, however, seems to distinguish a crab from a crab
machine, and it clearly distinguishes us from computers. The phe-
nomenon of consciousness remains terra incognita to neurobiologists
and cognitive scientists -an impenetrable wall for now.
Our choices proceed from our brains, and our brains are mate-
rial. In principle, a scientist who assembled one hundred billion neu-
rons one by one might build a brain that could do what ours do.
Stimulating a brain, depriving it of stimuli, or destroying a part of it
can alter a person's choices. We do not expect scientists to discover a
ghost in the machine.' 3 Although this machine has capacities we do
not fathom and is at least centuries beyond our ability to duplicate,
the idea of a free-will ghost inside it is silly.
It follows that when I decided to applaud David Currie's address
at the Law School's centennial celebration and then did it, my subjec-
tive sense of agency was an illusion. Within a fraction of a second of
the big bang, when the universe was the size of a softball, it was inevi-
table that a person of my appearance and with my name-namely
me-would applaud Currie's remarks at that moment. The idea that
my applause, the Ten Commandments, hippopotamuses, the Taj Ma-
100 See, for example, Hilary Bok, Freedom and Responsibility (Princeton 1998); John Mar-
tin Fischer and Mark Ranizza, Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility
(Cambridge 1998); R. Jay Wallace, Responsibility and Moral Sentiments (Harvard 1994); Gary
Watson, ed, Free Will (Oxford 1982).
101 This account depends on my ability to recall a conversation a dozen years ago, but I am
confident that my quotation is verbatim. Fogelin and I still have thirty-eight years to go to learn
whether he was correct.
102 See Steven Pinker, How the Mind Works 131-48 (Norton 1997) ("As far as scientific ex-
planation [of consciousness] goes, it might as well not exist.").
103 The "ghost in the machine" imagery is Gilbert Ryle's, The Concept of Mind 15-16 (Chi-
cago 1949).
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hal, Adolf Hitler, and Starbucks coffee were built into a softball-sized
universe billions of years ago seems as implausible as the idea that
there might be a ghost in my head-machine. Moreover, indeterminacy
or quantum-style randomness-a newcomer to the old contest-is
no more convincing as an alternative to human agency than
determinism. ' Iris Dement says that we must let the mystery
be.'O' Science should do all it can to trace my applause to its Planck-
time origins, but you should not mistake science's working assumption
for the truth about my clapping.
Although whoever has the burden of proof on the issue of
autonomy will fail, the business of living requires assumptions about
the unknowable, and deciding which way to bet does not seem diffi-
cult. Declaring ourselves powerless when, for all we know, we may not
be would be foolish. We have meaningful lives and perhaps a mean-
ingful universe to gain and nothing whatever to lose by wagering on
our ability to choose."°
In 1978, at the outset of the sentencing-reform movement, I
noted that although a corrective for the undue optimism of the past
was in order, the corrective could be carried too far. People might
grow tired of thinking of offenders as individuals: "Don't tell us that a
robber was retarded. We don't care about his problems. We don't
know what to do about his problems. The most important thing about
this robber is simply that ... [h]e committed the same crime as Bonnie
and Clyde." If this sort of sentiment prevailed, I thought that we
would lose something as human beings. '
Talk of rehabilitation through most of the twentieth century
seemed to mask only slightly the moral judgments that, almost every-
one realized, justified criminal punishment. When a judge announced
that an offender was young, had no prior record, and was therefore a
good prospect for rehabilitation, he simply declared in twentieth-
century code that the offender was not very blameworthy. A century
104 Scientists seem increasingly comfortable with the idea of uncaused physical phenomena
and with complex systems that provide "lessons, rather like the lessons for life our grandmoth-
ers told us. They are general ideas which apply broadly, but they must be applied with care and
good judgment." Leo P. Kadanoff, The 2000 Nora and Edward Ryerson Lecture: "Making a
Splash, Breaking a Neck: The Development of Complexity in Physical Systems," The University
of Chicago Record, Vol 35, No 4 at 2, 2.
105 Iris Dement, Let the Mystery Be, (Forerunner Music, Inc), recorded on Iris Dement, In-
famous Angel (Warner Bros Records 1992).
106 For an explanation of why this sort of analysis does not duplicate Pascal's discredited
wager on the afterlife, see William James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular
Philosophy (Longmans, Green 1897), reprinted in Louis Menand, ed, Pragmatism: A Reader 69,
72-73 (Vintage 1997). Of course everyone does wager that she and others are not automatons
except for periods when she lives at a university and gets weird.
107 See Albert W. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of Re-
cent Proposals for "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U Pa L Rev 550,557-58 (1978).
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of consequentialism, however, may persuade Americans actually to
become Clarence Darrow and to foreswear blame. They already have
turned too far from the most humane and humanizing of the purposes
of punishment.
